

**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
8 August 2011

Original: English

**General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session**

Agenda items 34, 39, 64, 66 and 75

**Security Council
Sixty-sixth year****Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their
implications for international peace, security
and development****The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan****Promotion and protection of the rights of children****Elimination of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance****Responsibility of States for internationally
wrongful acts****Letter dated 4 August 2011
from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I would like to refer to document A/65/915-S/2011/457, dated 26 July 2011, containing the letter of the representative of Azerbaijan.

I regret the fact that the Azerbaijani side keeps painting itself as the victim of "aggression" at the United Nations and other international organizations, without once acknowledging or honestly addressing its role in initiating military aggression against Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia.

Yet again, with the sole purpose of discrediting the Armenian side through falsifications and lies based on the so-called "conclusions of the preliminary investigation", last week the representative of Azerbaijan circulated the above-mentioned appalling letter accusing the Armenian side of the death of a 13-year-old child "as a result of the blast of an explosive device".

The authors of this allegation did not make possible an independent investigation to check the veracity behind such a horrible claim and clarify its circumstances. This type of allegation is being used by Azerbaijani diplomacy to avoid commitments already made. Suffice it to recall that under exactly this alleged pretext Azerbaijan tried to withdraw from an agreement to set up an investigative mechanism into ceasefire violations, which was the outcome of the Sochi Summit of the Presidents on 2 March 2011.



Regardless of their absurdity, these recent allegations serve as part of propagandistic war launched through excessive falsification and forgery.

It is unethical to circulate such defamatory information, exploiting again the life of an innocent child as a propaganda tool. Azerbaijan, which continues to refuse to take an honest look at itself, should be reminded that, as a result of aggression and war launched against Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia during the 1991-1994 period, Azerbaijan heavily contaminated the bordering regions with Armenia and other conflict-affected areas with landmines, cluster munitions and explosive remnants of war. They continue to have a profound impact on socio-economic growth and on the day-to-day lives of the Nagorno Karabakh population, resulting in one of the highest per capita human accident rates in the world.

Today, Azerbaijan continues to seriously obstruct the work of the respected mine-clearance HALO Trust charity that is carrying on an important humanitarian mission in the region, labelling that mission as "unlawful activities".

The fact that the independent investigation has not been conducted and Azerbaijan avoided establishing any investigative mechanism into ceasefire violations clearly demonstrate who stands behind these violations and false accusations.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter, along with the annex on the ceasefire violations for the period from 1 July to 1 August 2011, circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 39, 64, 66 and 75, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Garen Nazarian
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 4 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1 July to 1 August 2011

No.	Direction	Date/time	Firing	
			From the Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
1.	Berdavan	01.07.11 23.05	AK	7
2.	Khndzorut	02.07.11 02.10	AK	2
3.	Colagir	02.07.11 19.40	AK	1
4.	Vazashen	02.07.11 20.00	PK AK	20 15
5.	Vazashen	02.07.11 20.30	PK	7
6.	Vazashen	02.07.11 20.40	AK	20
7.	Agarak	02.07.11 22.20	AK	7
8.	Aygepar	03.07.11 22.50	AK	3
9.	Vazashen	04.07.11 00.40	AK	15
10.	Agarak	06.07.11 22.00	AK	10
11.	Chinari	07.07.11 18.50	SVD	2
12.	Barekamavan	09.07.11 14.00	AK	3
13.	Berdavan	09.07.11 20.35	SVD AK	11 10
14.	Khndzorut	09.07.11 12.15	AK	1
15.	Khndzorut	09.07.11 17.10	AK	3
16.	Barekamavan	11.07.11 02.20	AK	10
17.	Vazashen	11.07.11 16.15	AK	3

No	Direction	Date/time	Firing	
			From the Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
18.	Vazashen	11.07.11 19.00	AK	4
19.	Vazashen	11.07.11 01.20	AK SVD	6 2
20.	Barekamavan	14.07.11 18.40	AK	6
21.	Agarak	15.07.11 01.25	AK	11
22.	N. Karmirakhbyur	15.07.11 01.30	AK	8
23.	Vazashen	16.07.11 20.00	AK	5
24.	Paravacar	16.07.11 23.45	AK	3
25.	Vazashen	17.07.11 20.30	AK	5
26.	Vazashen	18.07.11 23.25	AK SVD	15 3
27.	Bardzravan	19.07.11 19.40	AK	100
28.	Chinari	21.07.11 00.01-00.20	PK	60
29.	Movses	20.07.11 11.45	AK	2
30.	Vazashen	21.07.11 18.50	AK	3
31.	Khndzorut	21.07.11 22.25	AK	4
32.	Khndzorut	22.07.11 00.45	AK	10
33.	Mehrab	22.07.11 11.45	PK	10
34.	Lev	25.07.11 09.45	AK	4
35.	Lev	25.07.11 17.30-18.00	AK PK sniper weapon 12.7mm	25 15 3
36.	Lev	25.07.11 19.00-20.00	AK PK sniper weapon 12.7mm	6 5 5
37.	Chinari	25.07.11 15.45	SVD	1

No.	Direction	Date/time	Firing	
			From the Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
38.	Movses	25.07.11 21.30	RPK	1
39.	Aygepar	25.07.11 22.15	AK	6
40.	Movses	26.07.11 00.30	AK	40
41.	Lev	26.07.11 21.50	sniper weapon 12.7mm	4
42.	Arcvaberd	26.07.11 12.40	sniper weapon 12.7mm	3
43.	Aygepar	26.07.11 12.50	sniper weapon 12.7mm	1
44.	Aygepar	26.07.11 16.20	AK	19
45.	Aygepar	26.07.11 16.30	AK	8
46.	Aygepar	26.07.11 18.05	AK	4
47.	Movses	26.07.11 18.20	AK	4
48.	Aygepar	26.07.11 18.35	AK	2
49.	Berdavan	26.07.11 20.55	SVD	5
50.	Berdavan	26.07.11 23.00	PK	30
51.	Dovegh	27.07.11 00.45	AK	3
52.	Aygepar	27.07.11 18.10	PK	5
53.	Movses	27.07.11 19.00	machine gun 12.7mm	1
54.	Movses	27.07.11 19.10	machine gun 12.7mm	2
55.	Aygepar	27.07.11 19.25	PK	10
56.	Aygepar	27.07.11 19.25	machine gun 12.7mm	140
			machine gun 12.7mm	75
57.	Aygepar	27.07.11 20.50-21.10	PK	110
			AK	650
58.	Berdavan	27.07.11 11.00	SVD	2

No	Direction	Date time	Firing	
			From the Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
59.	Lev	28.07.11 08.45	sniper weapon 12.7mm	6
			SVD	10
			PK	25
			AK	40
60.	Lev	28.07.11 20.25-21.15	PK	60
			machine gun 12.7mm	200
			sniper weapon 12.7mm	140
61.	Colagir	28.07.11 16.00	SVD	6
62.	Chinari	28.07.11 19.30	SVD	7
63.	Omar	29.07.11 20.30-20.45	SVD	3
64.	Omar	29.07.11 20.30-20.45	SVD	5
65.	Kutakan	29.07.11 18.00-18.30	PK	20
			machine gun 12.7mm	20
66.	Yanshak	30.07.11 21.50	SVD	4
			AK	10
67.	Barekamavan	30.07.11 18.00	RPK	5
			AK	5

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Armenia from 1 July to 1 August 2011:

Number of violations: 83

Shots: about 2,162

PK: (377), RPK: (6), SVD: (61), sniper weapon 12.7mm: (162), machine gun 12.7mm: (438), AK: (1,118).

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh from 1 July to 1 August 2011:

Number of violations: 861

Shots: about 4,652

PK: (653), RPG-7: (1), SVD: (303), machine gun 12.7mm: (248), sniper weapon 12.7mm: (29), sniper weapon 14.5mm (Istigal): (1), UTYOS-12.7mm: (114), AK: (3,258), AKM: (45).



Security Council

Distr.: General
8 August 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 5 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, under the presidency of India, the Security Council is scheduled to hold an open debate on the subject of United Nations peacekeeping operations on Friday, 26 August 2011. In order to help steer the discussions on the subject, India has prepared the attached concept note, entitled "Peacekeeping: taking stock and preparing for the future" (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) H. S. Puri
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 5 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

**Indian presidency of the Security Council
August 2011**

**Peacekeeping: taking stock and preparing for the future
A concept note**

Peacekeeping, a term that does not exist in the Charter of the United Nations, has become a central enterprise of the United Nations. It consumes more resources, employs more people and occupies a greater share of the Security Council's time than any single other issue. No other Council instrument has had a greater impact on the provenance and application of international law and international humanitarian law as its peacekeeping mandates. Peacekeeping represents, better than any other collective endeavour, the concept of Member States cooperating in the maintenance of international peace and security.

In the last two decades, peacekeeping budgets have increased approximately 27 times; the number of peacekeepers has grown about tenfold and the number of peacekeeping operations is at an all-time high. Despite serious shortcomings and abundant imperfections, it is evident that peacekeeping and peacekeepers have delivered results. The adoption of the mantle of peacekeeping by other international and regional security organizations, to describe out-of-area deployments, is another indicator of its success.

There have been several generations of peacekeeping operations. In the first five decades of their existence, United Nations peacekeeping missions were largely truce supervision operations or involved the interposition of military peacekeepers between combatants. Thereafter, peacekeeping missions changed dramatically in size, scope and nature. They were often deployed in the context of conflict within States (as opposed to conflict between States). Mandates expanded to include enforcement of certain norms and the assumption of certain functions usually undertaken by State authorities (e.g. elections, administration of justice, law enforcement). The Council also began to generate mandates that invoked Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter jointly. This meant that the number of situations where force could be used, or was required to be used, by peacekeepers grew significantly. In the process, these complex or multidimensional peacekeeping operations, launched over the last two decades, proceeded to acquire an added dimension of peacebuilding. A still newer generation of missions that have exclusive peacebuilding mandates has also appeared. It is now recognized that peacekeepers have been and are "early peacebuilders".

Peacekeeping operations have thus moved into newer territory. The change in the nature and scope of their mandates has involved important questions of international law in general, and issues of State sovereignty, international humanitarian law and international human rights law in particular. The extent to which peacekeeping missions can be used as instruments of innovation in the application of international law and norms is an area where a greater degree of common understanding is required among Member States. The relationship of these

innovations to the guiding principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate and impartiality, will require clarification for United Nations peacekeeping to retain its credibility and universal acceptability. Peacekeepers are often asked to make life-and-death decisions in situations of legal ambiguity. They are also frequently asked to make tough moral choices. Effective peacekeeping requires that the men and women operate in an environment of legal certitude.

The issue of consent, which has implications for the concept of State sovereignty that is the basis of the Charter, needs particular attention.

The central challenge that peacekeeping missions now face is the resource gap. The current annual outlay for peacekeeping is under \$8 billion. For purposes of comparison, it is interesting to note that while the number of United Nations peacekeepers is roughly the same as the number of soldiers in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed in Afghanistan, the total expenditure for United Nations peacekeeping in the last two decades (under \$50 billion) is reportedly less than the annual expenditure on ISAF.

There is a severe mismatch between the resources and the mandates of peacekeeping operations. The United Nations deployed just under 20,000 peacekeepers in the Congo in 1961 under the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Its mandate on the United Nations website is detailed in less than 300 words. About four decades later, the United Nations again deployed about 20,000 peacekeepers in the same country under the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The United Nations website takes about 3,000 words to describe their mandate.

The paucity of resources is made evident in a number of ways. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), for example, operates in an area that is almost continental in scale, but has to make do with a ratio of one peacekeeper for several hundred square kilometres in its area of responsibility. Enablers that would allow them to leverage their resources are not present in adequate quantity.

This is an unsatisfactory situation and a serious discussion is required on the issue of resources. The inability of the Council to address this will lead to a performance deficit on the part of United Nations peacekeeping missions, which in turn could erode the legitimacy of this Council.

Peacekeeping is partnership. It is a partnership between the Security Council, which represents the will of the international community, the General Assembly, which approves the budgets and the host country, which consents to a peacekeeping operation. Troop- and police-contributing countries are an integral part of this partnership and facilitate this cooperation. Their peacekeepers represent the Council on the ground and convert its word into deed. Troop- and police-contributing countries, in effect, are the vital intermediaries in this process.

The requirement that the Security Council consult them is based not only in the explicit provisions of Article 44 of the Charter but is also in the interest of efficient and effective functioning. The direct knowledge that troop- and police-contributing countries obtain of ground realities and their considerable experience in peacekeeping needs to be factored into the decision-making process of the Security Council. It is also evident that the Council requires greater access to information in

its vastly increased scope of functioning. Troop- and police-contributing countries, many of whom have not just troops but diplomatic presence, technical and economic cooperation activities and sometimes a civil society or commercial presence in the field, are uniquely suited to provide credible and relevant information.

There has been progress in improving the consultations process but there is scope for forward movement in order to fully exploit the potential of this relationship. Consultative meetings should be structured and predictable, in terms of timing and agenda. This will enable troop- and police-contributing countries to optimize their substantive contributions.

One of the reasons for which mandates are not aligned with resources is owing to insufficient consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries during the mandate generation process. The Brahimi report had recommended a two-stage mandate generation process wherein the Security Council can leave a resolution in draft form until such time as the Secretariat is able to confirm or deny that the required troops and critical support elements are available from contributing Member States. This has not so far been implemented, and it might be an opportune time to do so.

As global power, resources and capabilities are becoming more dispersed, the need to consult, and benefits arising therefrom, will increase.

Partnership has also meant innovations, such as the joint deployment of United Nations peacekeepers with regional and security organizations. About three-quarters of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and budgets are deployed in the African continent. The strengthening of African Union capacities in peacekeeping is a key requirement in improving security conditions in troubled parts of Africa.

Partnership does not mean ceding ground. The number of actors in conflict situations is increasing and the international community needs to develop synergies between these actors while guarding against duplication and waste. Peacekeeping is a core competence of the United Nations. Crises will occur again and the unique legitimacy and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping means that there is likely to be a continued demand for the capacities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and troop- and police-contributing countries. This expertise needs to be protected.

Policing and rule of law capabilities are required to consolidate the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Member States need to deliberate on the types of capacities that are required, the mix of capacities and their sourcing. This exercise needs to be undertaken in accordance with the needs of national authorities and relevance to conditions of the host countries. A capability-driven approach to peacekeeping that is demand-driven and responsive to national priorities needs to be fostered.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
1 August 2011

Original: English

Twenty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia**I. Introduction**

1. In its resolution 1938 (2010), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 30 September 2011 and requested me to report on preparations for the 2011 elections and progress in achieving the core transition benchmarks, including the development of a joint transition plan for the transfer of responsibility for internal security from UNMIL to the appropriate national authorities. The present report provides an update on major developments since my report of 14 February 2011 (S/2011/72) and contains my recommendations for the renewal of the UNMIL mandate.

II. Major developments**A. Political situation**

2. During the reporting period, political developments were dominated by activities of political parties in preparation for the upcoming constitutional referendum and the presidential and legislative elections, scheduled to take place on 23 August and 11 October, respectively. Despite a number of party mergers, including additions to the Unity Party, of which President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is a member, the political landscape remained fluid and fragmented, with significant floor-crossing. As of 1 August, 18 of the 32 registered political entities had elected their presidential candidates. Among the main parties from 2005, the Unity Party confirmed President Johnson Sirleaf as its presidential candidate and Vice-President Joseph Boakai as vice-presidential candidate; the Liberty Party elected Charles Brumskine and Bong County Senator Franklin Siakor as its presidential and vice-presidential candidates; and the Congress for Democratic Change elected Winston Tubman as its presidential candidate and George Weah, its 2005 presidential candidate, as its vice-presidential candidate. On 22 August, the National Elections Commission is scheduled to announce a provisional list of candidates for the 88 legislative seats being contested.

3. The Inter-Party Consultative Committee continued to provide an important forum for addressing key issues arising among political parties and the National Elections Commission, including modalities for the elections. Within the framework



of the Committee, an agreement was reached to start the political campaign period on 5 July instead of 18 August. However, disagreements remain among some parties and with the National Elections Commission regarding the legal framework for the elections, which could threaten the electoral timeline should they remain unresolved. One party took legal action to halt the electoral districting exercise on constitutional grounds, although the petition was not upheld by the Supreme Court. Another suit, on which there is still no ruling, disputed the composition of the National Elections Commission, and an injunction to halt the conduct of the referendum was sought on constitutional grounds, but no ruling has been made. My Special Representative has intensified her good offices to engage political parties in an inclusive dialogue to reach a common understanding regarding these issues, including the interpretation of article 91 of the Constitution, regarding the threshold required for the referendum to amend the Constitution.

4. Meanwhile, little progress has been made in the national reconciliation process since the President submitted the third quarterly report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to the legislature in January. As directed by the President, the Independent National Commission on Human Rights is expected to take on greater responsibilities regarding the recommendations, including to develop a road map for national reconciliation and to establish the Palava Hut Programme — a mechanism for perpetrators to seek public forgiveness. So far, there has been no concrete progress towards implementing the Palava Hut Programme, despite a statement by the President in June that it would be implemented in the coming months.

B. Security situation

5. The security situation in Liberia remained generally stable, but fragile. The impact of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire on the border areas of Liberia, combined with continuing ethnic and communal tensions and disputes over land and other resources, presented significant security challenges. Limited employment and livelihood opportunities, particularly among youth, remained major factors affecting security, while serious crime and other illegal activities are still prevalent.

6. As indicated in my latest report on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) dated 24 June 2011 (S/2011/387), the influx into Liberia of Ivorian combatants and Liberian nationals who fought in Côte d'Ivoire constituted a major security threat that the Government and UNMIL are working to address. In April, Government security personnel arrested a known former Liberian warlord for allegedly fighting in Côte d'Ivoire. During questioning, he reported that other fighters had returned to Liberia through unofficial border-crossing points. The Government has shown its intention to prosecute Liberians who fought in Côte d'Ivoire, and about 20 have been arrested to date, although most were released owing to lack of evidence and/or weak cases brought by the prosecution.

7. In June, 88 suspected Ivorian combatants, who were detained in a local prison after crossing the border in Maryland County in April, were interned in a special facility in Bong County. A mixed group of suspected fighters, including more than 90 Ivorian nationals, reportedly entered River Gee County in May, and on 14 June, Liberian security agencies retrieved a significant number of weapons and ammunition from a cache in River Gee County believed to have been hidden by this

group. UNMIL destroyed the weapons and ammunition in July and 37 people have been arrested in connection with the cache.

8. Tensions related to land disputes continued to pose serious threats to the long-term stability of Liberia. In March, following the renewal of a long-standing inter-county land dispute, about 50 people armed with cutlasses and single-barrel shotguns, allegedly from Maryland County, attacked a village in Grand Kru County, setting two houses ablaze. The national police and UNMIL intervened and brought the situation under control, and officers of the Emergency Response Unit of the Liberia National Police were subsequently deployed to maintain the peace.

9. Labour disputes also continued to cause security incidents, which are likely to increase given the development of large plantations and timber and extractive industries. On 26 May, 30 workers of the Cavalla Rubber Corporation in Maryland County went to the Magisterial Court, where four of their fellow workers were to appear following their arrest. On the way to court, elements from the Emergency Response Unit of the Liberia National Police attempted to stop them, and during the ensuing confrontation shot and killed one worker. Subsequently, a group of residents burned down two of the plantation buildings. The Liberia National Police and UNMIL were deployed to the scene and brought the situation under control. In March, protests in Monrovia regarding teachers' salary arrears escalated into violent clashes between students and Liberia National Police Support Unit officers, resulting in the temporary closure of the city's schools.

10. Ethnic tensions continued to be a concern. In June, an altercation between members of the Mano and Krahn ethnic groups in Sowaken Village, Grand Gedeh County, resulted in a group of about 20 members of the Krahn ethnic group attacking and destroying several houses and looting belongings of members of the Mano and Gio ethnic groups. Liberian security officials and UNMIL responded and restored calm.

11. Six incidents of mob violence against police authorities and infrastructure were reported in the period. In May, a traffic accident between an UNMIL vehicle and a motorcycle taxi resulted in a mob clashing violently with the national police, and the destruction by fire of a police station in Saclapea, Nimba County.

C. Economic situation

12. Economic growth in 2010 was 5.6 per cent, slightly lower than the projected rate of 6.3 per cent. The growth rate for 2011 is projected to be 6.8 per cent. Commodity exports continued to rebound, and modest expansion of the service sector and increases in foreign direct investment, mainly in extractive industries, contributed to economic growth. In May, the Government submitted a draft national budget of \$458.9 million for fiscal year 2011/12, which was 26 per cent greater than the previous year's budget. Despite achieving the completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in June 2010, which reduced the country's debt stock significantly, the Government has taken only a few concessional loans.

13. Inflation was projected to be higher in 2011, at 8.1 per cent, compared to 7.2 per cent in 2010, reflecting the vulnerability of Liberia to global price increases of fuel and food, as it imports about two thirds of its food supply. A recent survey found that domestic prices of essential goods, especially rice, rose by an average of

more than 30 per cent over the last six months. Also, a 2010 Labour Force Survey estimated that 77 per cent of employed Liberians were vulnerably employed and unable to count on basic benefits or job security.

14. Following the Government's decision to extend the poverty reduction strategy from June to December 2011, preparations have been under way to develop a framework for a successor programme. Led by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the Governance Commission, 15 sectoral working groups were established to review implementation of the poverty reduction strategy and produce sectoral road maps for continued development of the country's economic, social and infrastructural sectors to feed into the second phase of the poverty reduction strategy, ultimately forming part of the Liberia Rising Vision 2030 Project.

D. Regional situation

15. The post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire has created significant security and humanitarian challenges for Liberia. As indicated in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the continued presence of militias and other armed elements in western Côte d'Ivoire and border areas continued to pose a threat for the entire subregion, particularly Liberia. The Government, supported by UNMIL, is increasing its patrolling and presence along the Ivorian border to monitor the situation and provide deterrence, but the 700-km border is difficult to monitor. UNMIL and UNOCI have intensified inter-mission cooperation, including restarting joint border activities under "Operation Mayo", increasing joint meetings, coordinating ground and air patrols and institutionalizing information-sharing, including by establishing liaison officers in neighbouring contingents across the border. UNMIL and UNOCI conducted a joint assessment mission to western Côte d'Ivoire in June. Furthermore, the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire have engaged in discussions about border security, including on 9 July, when the Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire led a delegation on an official visit to Monrovia. An extraordinary summit of the Mano River Union was held in Monrovia on 17 July, where, in addition to other issues, cross-border security cooperation was discussed, and it was decided that a technical committee would be established to better coordinate border security issues in the region.

16. Renewed tensions in Guinea are being monitored closely. Violent clashes in May between members of the Kpelle and Mandingo ethnic groups in the town of Galakpai, near the Liberian border, led to an influx of Guineans into Liberia, primarily from the Kpelle ethnic group. By 1 August, the Liberian refugee agency estimated that more than 3,000 Guinean nationals had sought refuge in several border towns in Bong County, Liberia. Meanwhile, during the period, the Government of Liberia and UNMIL continued to conduct joint border operations with the Governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone.

17. Liberia continued to be vulnerable to drug trafficking. Hard drugs, including heroin and cocaine, transit through Liberia in limited amounts. Domestic production of marijuana is flourishing and in many areas is thought to be replacing other agricultural activities, with large amounts crossing into neighbouring countries. There are also reports of human trafficking using similar routes. In May, the Government joined the West Africa Coast Initiative, a multi-stakeholder framework

for implementing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regional action plan to address the growing problem of illicit drug trafficking and organized crime in West Africa; and in July the Liberia National Police Transnational Crime Unit began operations.

E. Humanitarian situation

18. By the end of May, more than 180,000 refugees from Côte d'Ivoire were registered in Grand Gedeh, Maryland, Nimba and River Gee Counties. After verification by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and some returns, mainly from Nimba County, refugee figures were estimated to be 140,000 at the end of June. However, influxes into southern Liberia continued, albeit at a slower pace, and by 1 August the total number of registered refugees was estimated to be 160,000. Refugee camps were constructed in Nimba and Maryland Counties, transit camps are being converted into permanent camps, and a new camp is being constructed in Grand Gedeh County. The vast majority of refugees, however, remain in remote border communities, making the delivery of assistance difficult and putting pressure on already scarce resources in host communities. The Government is therefore encouraging refugees to relocate to refugee camps or villages farther from the border, which are considered more secure. A revised emergency humanitarian action plan was launched on 24 March and included a request for \$146.5 million to support 150,000 refugees, of which 50 per cent has been funded. The plan has been revised further to cover the humanitarian needs of 160,000 refugees and 100,000 Liberians in host communities, requesting a total of \$166 million for the rest of 2011.

III. Mandate implementation

A. Preparations for elections

19. Preparations for the referendum and elections took on greater momentum, with the National Elections Commission confirming 23 August 2011 as the date for a constitutional referendum. There are four proposed amendments to the Constitution, three of which are election related: to change the electoral system from an absolute to a simple majority for all elections except those for president and vice-president; to move election day from October to November; and to revise the residency clause for presidential and vice-presidential candidates from 10 to 5 consecutive years immediately prior to an election. The fourth provision would increase the mandatory retirement age for chief justices to 75. The National Elections Commission has confirmed the date for the presidential and legislative elections as 11 October 2011, although the results of the referendum may shift them to 8 November. The voter registration exercise concluded in February and, according to the National Elections Commission, close to 1.8 million people registered, representing about 89 per cent of the estimated eligible population, of whom 49 per cent are women.

20. The National Elections Commission launched a civic and voter education campaign on 5 April, designing a number of activities in partnership with civil society. UNMIL supported the dissemination of information on the electoral process through radio programmes and other outreach activities in rural areas. Also, training

was conducted by the National Elections Commission and other partners for over 400 women political aspirants. Despite delays owing to a writ of prohibition before the Supreme Court that questioned the constitutionality of conducting districting based on the Threshold Bill, the National Elections Commission was able to complete districting countrywide and issued a final map on 8 July. The overall electoral timeline was maintained, and candidate nominations started as scheduled on 20 July.

21. My Special Representative supported the reactivation of the International Contact Group for Liberia and other initiatives to support the inter-party dialogue of the National Elections Commission, as outlined in paragraph 3 above. UNMIL intensified its work with Liberian authorities to create an atmosphere conducive to peaceful elections and strengthened its monitoring of electoral, legal, political, public information, security and human rights issues to mitigate tensions, while closely monitoring the political campaign. To help ensure a level playing field, UNMIL Radio continues to provide equitable air time to all parties to discuss their political platforms, and the Mission provided a human rights checklist to national observer groups to assist with monitoring during electoral periods.

22. UNMIL coordinated international assistance to the electoral process through the Donor Coordination Group and continues efforts to mobilize donors to help mitigate the \$4 million shortfall in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) basket fund. UNMIL also provided capacity-building for national security institutions in the planning and training of personnel to provide security for the elections, although resources still have not been identified by the Government to cover the cost of securing the elections. Meanwhile, the Mission has developed security and contingency plans for the provision of effective security support to national authorities for the conduct of peaceful elections.

23. The National Elections Commission developed its plan to deliver electoral materials to the 1,780 polling precincts and has requested the support of UNMIL to deliver materials by air to the least accessible magisterial warehouses in six of the 15 counties. UNMIL deployed magisterial electoral officers to support National Elections Commission magistrates in all counties. Conducting the referendum, and possibly the first round of elections, at the height of the rainy season will be a formidable logistical challenge. Given that the ballots cannot be printed until the outcome of the referendum is known, the timeline between ballot printing and distribution will be extremely tight.

B. Security sector reform

1. National security strategy and architecture

24. Concerned stakeholders called for the passing of key pieces of security sector-related legislation before the current legislative session ends. The House of Representatives Security Committee held a public hearing on the National Security Reform and Intelligence Bill on 11 May, and a number of proposals put forward at the hearing were incorporated into the draft, including a provision to maintain, in some form, the Drug Enforcement Administration, which was originally to be dissolved and its activities incorporated into the Liberia National Police.

25. The UNDP Justice and Security Trust Fund, whose remit was recently extended to include support to justice institutions, and the Peacebuilding Fund have begun to play important roles in supporting the growth of the security sector, in particular the work of the Liberia National Police and other security and justice institutions. While the Peacebuilding Fund is financing the development of the Gbarnga Justice and Security Hub, the UNDP Justice and Security Trust Fund has provided support to the national police, immigration and corrections services and the judiciary by providing support for training, mobility and critical infrastructure. The Government has made modest progress in increasing security sector allocations in the 2011-2012 national budget, although the issue of recurring costs remains a challenge. The need to scale up support for the security sector, particularly the Liberia National Police, is becoming more evident in view of the upcoming UNMIL transition. In terms of promoting enhanced oversight and accountability, a review of the capacity of legislative security committees has been initiated.

2. Armed Forces of Liberia

26. The current strength of the Armed Forces of Liberia stands at 2,012, including infantry, engineering and military police units, as well as a coast guard of 51 personnel with four vessels. Fifty military mentors from the United States of America continued to support the building of a professional and capable force, including developing army staff to assume greater command responsibilities. The army has implemented its 2010-2011 annual training plan, the culmination of which was the execution of two UNMIL-supported battalion-level field exercises in April 2011, as well as a training package to prepare the army for potential future peacekeeping duties. The army successfully conducted a number of joint operations, including a complex operation with other security institutions, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and UNMIL, in June, to transport suspected former combatants from Côte d'Ivoire across the country to the Government-designated internment camp. The Coast Guard also conducted joint operations with UNMIL aerial maritime patrols in coastal waterways to identify and report illegal maritime activities.

27. Although it had been estimated that the army would become fully operational in 2012, a number of factors, including insufficient equipment, delays in the procurement of new assets and continued delays in endorsing the national defence strategy, will likely delay the army's full operational status until at least 2014. Nevertheless, activities and operations undertaken so far showed growing operational capacity.

28. Incidents of ill-discipline on the part of Armed Forces personnel, including harassment of civilians, altercations with national police, including one resulting in the murder of a police officer, and criminal activity, continued to raise concern.

3. Liberia National Police

29. Efforts to address the situation along the border between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire and planning for the elections have created significant challenges for the Liberia National Police, an already stretched organization that is continuing to develop its institutional capacity. The Liberia National Police Emergency Response Unit and other police officers have engaged in border operations, in collaboration with other security agencies and with support from UNMIL, which presented a unique opportunity to test the capacity of national security agencies. While the

Liberia National Police has shown increased capacity to execute complex operations, those operations have also revealed worrisome logistical and capability gaps. In particular, mobility remains a major issue, affecting their ability to rapidly deploy throughout the country, with UNMIL continuing to provide air and other logistical support. The Liberia National Police also prepared to assume the primary security role during the referendum and elections.

30. In the light of the transition planning process and the evolving security situation along the border, UNMIL worked with the Liberia National Police to reprioritize projects in its strategic plan. Twenty-five priority projects are nearing completion and have already had an impact on foundational and structural systems, such as fleet management and vehicle accountability measures. A manpower establishment plan to identify rational staffing requirements and ranking structures, which takes into account changing needs to cover regional headquarters staffing, is almost finalized.

31. With UNMIL and donor support, the National Police Training Academy continued to train new police officers. As at 1 August, there were 4,153 Liberia National Police officers, including 620 Police Support Unit officers and 322 Emergency Response Unit officers. The Police Support Unit's overall strength of 620 personnel meets the strategic objective to train 600 such officers by the time elections are held, although recent graduates are not yet fully operational, lacking equipment and logistical support. Overall, female representation in the police force stands at 16 per cent.

32. The development of the Bureau for Immigration and Naturalization continued. In addition to completing a number of documents laying its institutional foundation, the agency has been active along the border of Côte d'Ivoire, which has highlighted the huge challenges the Bureau still faces. The UNDP Justice and Security Trust Fund is providing support to enhance its capacity and arrangements are being made for immigration officers to be housed in the Gbarnga Hub, which will provide an effective forward operational base.

C. Judicial, legal and corrections institutions

33. Coordination and collaboration within the justice sector and between the justice and security sectors has continued to strengthen. A joint judiciary and Ministry of Justice retreat in February and the subsequent peacebuilding workshop brought major stakeholders together to prioritize needs to improve justice delivery. UNMIL continued to focus on strengthening the capacity of rule of law institutions and mechanisms, supporting efforts to improve delivery and access to justice and mentoring key justice-sector actors.

34. The Government-led Pretrial Detention Task Force continued its efforts to address delays in the criminal justice system and developed an action plan. A draft on reforming the jury law to expedite the processing of criminal cases has been prepared for presentation to the legislature. Also, an assessment of existing record-keeping systems in courts and prosecutors' offices has been completed, and new standardized designs have been developed to better track cases. Furthermore, 61 non-lawyer magistrates graduated from the Judicial Institute's Professional Magistrates Training Programme in June, which should increase the efficiency of the criminal justice system, especially in rural areas. Although anticipated

consultations regarding the harmonization of formal and customary justice systems have not yet been held, the issue remained on the Government's agenda and related activities are ongoing, including an assessment of the tribal governors' court system.

35. Despite these positive developments, significant challenges continued to slow progress in the justice sector, particularly insufficient human capacity, infrastructure and equipment; outdated legal frameworks; and dependence on donor funding. An illustration of this is a one-year project tracking cases of sexual violence through the criminal justice system, completed in April, which found that it would take roughly 10 years, working at the current capacity, to clear the backlog of sexual violence cases alone.

36. Although comprehensive efforts continued to improve prevention, response to and management of cases of sexual and gender-based violence, the high number of reported rapes, particularly those involving young victims, remained a serious concern. Efforts continued to strengthen the Liberia National Police Women and Children Protection Section, and its headquarters was completed in April. Improvements in case follow-through and coordination with prosecutors have been noted. A team of experts from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict visited Liberia in April to identify support that could be most useful to the Government in responding to sexual violence.

37. The security situation in corrections facilities remained fragile, with 10 prison escape incidents recorded in the past six months. Prison population trends outside of Monrovia showed a slow but steady increase, while the population at Monrovia Central Prison remained stable, owing largely to the special mobile magistrates' court operating there. Pretrial detention rates remained extremely high at 80 per cent nationwide. Although overcrowding remained an issue in all facilities, there was some progress in developing prisoner rehabilitation activities at a number of facilities.

D. Human rights

38. Liberia continued its efforts to apply a human rights approach to policy and planning and to improve its human rights situation. In March, a Government delegation attended the Human Rights Council universal periodic review follow-up session in Geneva to present responses to the remaining 41 recommendations out of a total of 113 from the November 2010 session. The session addressed a number of issues, including the application of the death penalty, measures to address sexual and gender-based violence, harmful traditional practices and the implementation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommendations. The delegation from Liberia noted that while steps were being taken to address these issues, it could not take a position on the repeal of the death penalty and the criminalization of female genital mutilation. A mechanism has been put in place to promote and monitor implementation of the universal periodic review recommendations. UNMIL supported the Government of Liberia in its preparation for the universal periodic review as part of its ongoing capacity-building, monitoring and advocacy mandate.

39. Since its formal establishment in October 2010, the functioning of the Independent National Commission on Human Rights has been limited. Although the Commission has conducted some monitoring visits and has investigated allegations

of excessive force by police in Monrovia, it has faced internal divisions that have compromised its public image and affected implementation of its 2011 workplan. Civil society organizations, through the Transitional Justice Working Group, are holding talks with the commissioners to facilitate a refocus on the Commission's mandate.

E. Consolidation of State authority

40. The Government took a number of steps to consolidate State authority, including extending administrative services from county headquarters to districts, deploying additional technical staff, building administrative capacity and paying salaries more regularly. The President formally endorsed the decentralization policy, providing for political, fiscal and administrative devolution of authority to the 15 county administrations and preparing the policy for legislative action. With the support of international partners, a pilot decentralization project is being implemented in nine counties. Challenges remain, however, especially relating to logistics and retaining trained and qualified technical staff. Although coordination mechanisms for the implementation of the poverty reduction strategy and county development agendas continued to function, meetings have been irregular owing to the absenteeism of key county officials.

41. The Government has instituted stricter guidelines and procedures for the use of the county development fund, which was frozen in 2010 owing to allegations of mismanagement. The recruitment of county field monitoring officers to track and report on the use of the fund is expected to help restore public confidence in local authorities.

42. Extensive work has been conducted on over 1,000 km of road since November 2010, in particular in the south-east, to which the Government and multilateral and bilateral donors have contributed, while UNMIL continued to carry out repairs along its main supply routes. However, Liberia still does not have new major paved-road construction, which hampers the efforts of the Government to provide services throughout the country.

F. Governance

43. Legal and other bottlenecks continued to hamper the effective prosecution of major corruption cases, and although the first corruption conviction was handed down in May, involving Central Bank employees accused of recycling cheques, the case was at a relatively low level. Follow-up on recommendations of General Auditing Commission audit reports continued to be slow. In March, President Johnson Sirleaf announced that she would not renominate the Auditor-General for another term.

44. The operations of the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission continued with a nationwide information campaign on integrity in public conduct. The Commission has submitted a total of 25 corruption cases to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution since March 2009. However, the President's proposal that the Commission acquire prosecutorial powers has not yet been pursued.

45. The Land Commission completed its five-year strategic plan and established a land dispute resolution task force to develop policy and explore alternative dispute resolution methods. The Commission also continued its work on the harmonization of county boundaries, but only 2 of 10 disputes had been resolved so far because of resource constraints. Also, after two years of working under executive orders, in June the President signed into law the act establishing the Law Reform Commission. Limited progress was made in the Constitutional reform process, despite the efforts of the Governance Commission to revive the Constitutional Review Task Force.

G. Management of natural resources

46. Control of diamond mining and trade continued to face challenges. Implementation of the recommendations of the 2009 Kimberley Process review mission and the Panel of Experts on Liberia (S/2009/640) continued to be slow. A meeting of the Presidential Task Force on Diamonds, which had not met for over 10 months, took place on 15 July and agreed to revitalize the work of the task force and hold more frequent meetings. With international support, the database system to record diamond statistics is now functional and regional diamond offices are being strengthened. A total of 18,046 carats of rough diamonds, valued at \$9.9 million, were exported between January and June, with the Government collecting almost \$300,000 in revenue. The Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy began conducting Kimberley Process compliance awareness activities in and around mining locations in Gbarpolu, Grand Cape Mount and Nimba Counties.

47. Government revenue from the commercial forestry sector was short of expectations, with operators paying only \$2.1 million of the \$13.5 million owed during fiscal year 2010-2011. A Government task force has been established to review the tax regime and assess whether easing some requirements might improve company compliance. The Forestry Development Authority has also issued procedures for community forestry development committees to access and manage funds on behalf of affected communities legally entitled to benefit-sharing. The establishment and operation of palm oil plantations on about 460,000 ha of land leased by concession companies in western and south-eastern counties commenced. However, the extension of operations is meeting resistance from communities, which request compensation and protest a lack of consultation on concession agreements.

H. Integration of the United Nations system

48. Further progress was made towards the "delivering as one" principle. In March, a monitoring and evaluation support unit was established to support "one programme" development. Also, in April, a road map was drafted outlining the programmatic and operational adjustments required to lead the United Nations in Liberia towards a "one programme" framework and harmonized services, and the United Nations Communications Group developed a new workplan based on "delivering as one" principles. The road map is being aligned with the Government's national visioning and growth and development processes.

IV. Cross-cutting issues

A. Public information

49. The United Nations worked closely with the Government and other partners on the refugee crisis, ensuring that host communities were given appropriate recognition for their generosity. UNMIL continued to work with the Liberia National Police and the Ministry of Justice to build capacity, including through on-the-job training for public information officers. The finalists of the joint Government/UNMIL annual talent competition "A Star Is Born" launched a musical compact disc with songs on the theme of children's rights.

B. Gender

50. To enhance gender mainstreaming, a participatory gender audit is being conducted of all United Nations agencies, including UNMIL. Continued support has been provided to mainstream a gender perspective into Government policies, including for the immigration and corrections services and for skills training for female police officers. An assessment of gender training programmes for security sector institutions was also conducted, with immediate follow-up action undertaken for the army, corrections and immigration services.

C. HIV/AIDS

51. UNMIL conducted awareness and prevention training on HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections for newly deployed peacekeepers and offered voluntary HIV testing and behaviour change communication services. To increase the pool of HIV/AIDS peer counsellors, 23 national staff were trained. All services have been extended to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes operating in Liberia.

D. Conduct and discipline

52. UNMIL continued its efforts to ensure compliance with the zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse through the implementation of preventive measures, such as induction and refresher training, spot-checks of off-limits establishments and an ongoing awareness-raising campaign aimed at sensitizing local communities. During the reporting period, 2,689 people in all United Nations personnel categories received integrated conduct and discipline training, including on the zero-tolerance policy, stress management and HIV/AIDS awareness. UNMIL also provided sexual exploitation- and abuse-awareness training for 563 members of local communities.

53. During the reporting period, 26 allegations of serious misconduct were reported, including 16 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, reflecting an overall increase from the previous reporting period.

E. Security and safety of United Nations personnel

54. Crime continued to pose a major security threat to United Nations personnel and property, especially in Monrovia. Five incidents of armed robbery targeting United Nations personnel were reported during the period in addition to 56 non-weapon-related crimes, including burglary, theft and assault. Three national staff members, three military personnel and one police officer died as a result of shooting, illness or accident.

V. Mission deployment

A. Military component

55. As indicated in my previous reports, the pre-drawdown adjustments to UNMIL in 2006, together with the three stages of the Mission's formal drawdown, which was completed in May 2010, and the withdrawal of the military guard force from the Special Court in Sierra Leone in March 2011, reduced the Mission's troop strength from 15,250 to its current authorized military strength of 7,952 personnel.

56. The UNMIL force headquarters is located in Monrovia, with operating forces deployed in two sectors, each comprising three infantry battalions. The Quick Reaction Force is based in Monrovia, with two forward operating bases near routes to the borders of Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. A total of 43 troop-contributing countries are represented among 7,703 troops, 79 staff officers and 130 military observers, including 209 women.

57. During the reporting period, UNMIL continued to support UNOCI through inter-mission cooperation arrangements pursuant to relevant Security Council resolutions. Two military utility helicopters temporarily deployed to UNOCI returned to UNMIL on 28 June, while three armed helicopters remain deployed to UNOCI, providing critical support for joint border operations conducted by the two missions.

B. Police component

58. As at 1 August, the police strength of UNMIL stood at 1,330, out of an authorized ceiling of 1,375, including 456 police advisers, 843 officers in seven formed police units and 31 correction officers. There are 200 women in the police component. Three formed police units are deployed in Monrovia and one unit each in Bong, Grand Bassa, Grand Gedeh and Lofa Counties. UNMIL also has 11 immigration advisers.

VI. Peacebuilding commission

59. The Liberia Peacebuilding Programme, based on the Peacebuilding Fund priority plan and estimated at \$71 million, was approved on 5 May 2011. The three-year programme is focused on justice, security and national reconciliation. A core project is the establishment of five regional justice and security hubs to provide more effective justice and security services and presence throughout the country.

The Peacebuilding Fund has allotted an initial contribution of \$20,154,000 for the implementation of the Programme, and the Peacebuilding Commission has initiated resource mobilization activities.

60. In June, the first official visit of a Peacebuilding Commission delegation, comprising Jordan, Liberia, Nigeria, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States, travelled to Liberia. The visit followed two earlier missions to Liberia by the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission Liberia Configuration. The delegation met with national and international stakeholders, advocating legislative reform and the establishment of accountability and oversight mechanisms for the security and justice sectors. The Chair also received the President's endorsement of a proposal to develop a national reconciliation strategy, while the Government agreed to focus on certain key priorities for the first year, including the functioning of the Gbarnga Hub, the development of hubs two and three and support for the development of new corrections facilities and courts in some rural areas. With regard to reconciliation, it was agreed to prioritize initial support for land reform and youth empowerment.

VII. Transition planning

61. In its resolution 1938 (2010), the Security Council requested that UNMIL and the Government of Liberia continue to make progress in the transition planning process, especially towards conducting a comprehensive situational assessment and identifying critical gaps to be filled to facilitate a successful transition, and also requested that the United Nations and the Government draw up a joint transition plan on the transfer of responsibility for internal security from UNMIL to the appropriate national authorities. The Council also requested a revision of the Mission's benchmarks to include transition benchmarks, which would guide the handover of security responsibilities from UNMIL to national authorities. These were set out in my previous report, dated 14 February 2011 (S/2011/72).

62. Following a transition workshop in June 2010, the Government and UNMIL initiated a joint transition planning process. Led by the National Security Council, the process has resulted in the establishment of a senior-level core group, a working group and four security task groups covering the areas of border security, law and order, security of assets and logistics. Joint situational assessment and transition worksheets have been developed outlining specific tasks to be handed over to national authorities. In April 2011, the four task groups began assessing the capacity of Liberian security agencies to assume responsibility in the four areas. However, progress has slowed, particularly for the Liberia National Police, which will absorb much of the burden for law and order and security of assets. The present focus on border security and security for the elections has overstretched the Government's planning capacity, and engagement on transition issues is likely to decrease during the electoral period.

63. With regard to the development of a joint security transition plan, a number of important tasks remain outstanding, including reaching agreement on the nature of the remaining gaps, identifying a strategy for filling critical gaps and devising a strategic approach that allows for testing the ability of national authorities to maintain security independently of UNMIL, which will be linked to Government security plans and the capacity to implement them. In my next report, I intend to

provide proposals for taking forward the preparation of a joint transition plan for the transfer of responsibility for internal security from UNMIL to the appropriate national authorities.

64. With regard to the transition strategy for handing over the Mission's civilian activities, in June a task force began mapping UNMIL civilian support activities to the Government and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, which will inform discussions on complementing ongoing security-transition planning and dovetailing with the "delivering as one" process.

VIII. Financial aspects

65. The General Assembly, in its resolution 65/301, appropriated the amount of \$525.6 million, equivalent to some \$43.8 million per month, inclusive of \$513.4 million for the maintenance of UNMIL for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 and \$12.2 million for electoral support to be provided by the Mission. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMIL beyond 30 September 2011, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2012 would be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly.

66. As at 15 July 2011, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNMIL amounted to \$55.0 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as of that date amounted to \$1,475.3 million.

67. As at 30 June 2011, amounts owed to troop and formed police contributors totalled some \$29.8 million. Reimbursement of troop/formed police costs and contingent-owned equipment costs have been made for the period up to 31 May and 31 March 2011, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IX. Observations

68. Liberia is about to engage in its second round of democratic elections since the end of the conflict. The success of these elections, and the peaceful inauguration of a new administration, will be critical to the consolidation of the tremendous progress the country has made over the past eight years. With the successful completion of the voter registration exercise, Liberian authorities have shown increasing capacity to plan and execute the complex national event that the referendum and the elections represent, and it will be important to maintain this momentum throughout the process. The United Nations family in Liberia will continue to provide technical and logistical support, as required, to ensure the operational success of the exercise. However, the logistical challenges will be significant, as possibly all electoral events will be conducted during the country's rainy season and timelines will be extremely tight. I therefore urge all political actors and the population at large to make the utmost effort to ensure that the upcoming elections will be free, fair and without violence.

69. As the elections draw near and campaign activities intensify, I urge all political parties to use the democratic space to canvass support for their political positions while refraining from inflammatory remarks and provocative actions. It is important to adhere to the electoral timeline. I encourage the prompt resolution of the remaining differences between political parties and the National Elections

Commission concerning their understanding of certain aspects of the legal framework, and parties and citizens are encouraged to use legal channels and dispute mechanisms to resolve disputes that may arise regarding the electoral process. In this regard, I welcome the reactivation of the International Contact Group on Liberia, and am encouraged by increased dialogue within the Inter-Party Consultative Committee. The United Nations will continue to support the electoral process, including through the good offices of my Special Representative.

70. The work of the Government/UNMIL joint transition working group has highlighted a considerable number of national security gaps that will need to be addressed to enable a smooth handover of security responsibilities from UNMIL to national institutions. The situation along the border between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire presented opportunities for security institutions to demonstrate their operational capacity but revealed persistent challenges, especially in relation to logistics and equipment. It is therefore urgent that the Government's international partners increase support for the development of the security sector to ensure that UNMIL operations can be progressively scaled down as it hands over security responsibilities to national authorities. In this regard, I welcome the Peacebuilding Commission's focus on the five regional justice and security hubs, as they will increase access to justice and security throughout the country. I urge bilateral partners to support the hubs, the UNDP Justice and Security Trust Fund and the Liberia Peacebuilding Programme to promote increased effectiveness and accountability of the country's security and rule of law sectors, with a focus on institutional oversight and management, as well as critical logistical support and equipment, in particular to ensure that the Liberia National Police are adequately equipped before the elections.

71. I am concerned by the slow implementation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's recommendations, especially given the critical role reconciliation will play towards sustainable peace. I encourage the Independent National Commission on Human Rights to overcome its internal problems. The Commission must perform its critical mandate to serve as the country's premier independent human rights institution, as well as take on its central role in mapping the steps towards implementing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's recommendations.

72. The refugee situation and security-related issues emanating from the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire present significant challenges for Liberia. It is critical that financial support be provided to the revised Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan to cover humanitarian needs to the end of 2011, especially given that the influx of refugees continues. I am encouraged by the Government's proactive approach to addressing the issue of fighters from Côte d'Ivoire and welcome the establishment of a special internment facility for suspected Ivorian combatants. I also welcome the increased cooperation between the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire and the intensified inter-mission cooperation between UNMIL and UNOCI to address cross-border security challenges. I urge all stakeholders to prevent the movement of weapons, to separate refugees from former combatants and to ensure that suspected former combatants are treated in accordance with the law.

73. In its resolution 1938 (2010), the Security Council renewed the mandate of UNMIL until 30 September 2011, with an authorized strength of 7,952 military and 1,375 police personnel. Given the still limited capacity of national security institutions and the critical need to support electoral, border and other security

operations, the recommendations contained in my special report of 10 June 2009 (see S/2009/299) to maintain the Mission's military and police components at that authorized strength until after the 2011 elections remain valid. A comprehensive technical assessment mission, led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, will be deployed to Liberia after the inauguration of the next Government in order to develop detailed proposals for the next stages of the Mission's drawdown, including further reductions of the military component. That assessment will include a thorough review of the progress made towards the benchmarks developed for the security transition and will be conducted in close consultation with the Government of Liberia and all relevant stakeholders. I will provide the Security Council with my proposals for the next stages of the Mission's drawdown and the security transition in early 2012 in a special report containing the findings and recommendations of the assessment mission. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the Mission's mandate for a period of one year, until 30 September 2012, and conduct a review of its authorized military and police strength by 30 May 2012, based on the findings of the technical assessment mission mentioned above.

74. In conclusion, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my Special Representative for Liberia, Ellen Margrethe Løj, and UNMIL civilian and uniformed personnel for their contribution towards peace consolidation in Liberia. I would also like to thank all troop- and police-contributing countries; ECOWAS; the African Union; the International Contact Group on Liberia; United Nations agencies, funds and programmes; multilateral and bilateral donors; and international and local non-governmental organizations for their commitment and contributions to sustain peace and support development in Liberia.

Annex

United Nations Mission in Liberia: military and police strength

(As at 1 August 2011)

Country	Military component				Formed police units	Civilian police
	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops	Total		
Argentina	0	0	0	0		13
Bangladesh	14	7	1 433	1 454		16
Benin	2	1	0	3		0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2	1	0	3		0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	0	0	0		12
Brazil	0	2	0	2		0
Bulgaria	2	0	0	2		0
China	2	6	558	566		17
Croatia	0	2	0	2		0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0		4
Denmark	3	2	0	5		0
Ecuador	2	1	0	3		0
Egypt	5	0	0	5		4
El Salvador	2	0	0	2		1
Ethiopia	8	4	0	12		0
Fiji	0	0	0	0		28
Finland	0	2	0	2		0
France	0	1	0	1		0
Gambia	1	0	0	1		18
Germany	0	0	0	0		5
Ghana	9	7	700	716		20
India	0	0	0	0	243	3
Indonesia	1	0	0	1		0
Jamaica						1
Jordan	4	5	114	123	240	13
Kenya	0	0	0	0		18
Kyrgyzstan	3	0	0	3		2
Malaysia	6	0	0	6		0
Mali	1	0	0	1		0
Mongolia	0	2	148	150		0
Montenegro	2	0	0	2		0
Namibia	1	3	0	4		4
Nepal	2	3	15	20	240	14
Niger	2	0	0	2		0

Country	Military component				Formed police units	Civilian police
	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops	Total		
Nigeria	12	9	1 553	1 574	120	19
Norway	0	0	0	0		9
Pakistan	7	10	2 942	2 959		24
Paraguay	2	1	0	3		0
Peru	2	2	0	4		0
Philippines	2	1	115	118		30
Poland	2	0	0	2		3
Republic of Korea	1	1	0	2		0
Republic of Moldova	2	0	0	2		0
Romania	2	0	0	2		0
Russian Federation	4	0	0	4		11
Rwanda	0	0	0	0		3
Samoa	0	0	0	0		0
Senegal	1	1	0	2		0
Serbia	4	0	0	4		6
Sri Lanka	0	0	0	0		13
Sweden	0	0	0	0		13
Switzerland						3
Togo	2	1	0	3		0
Turkey	0	0	0	0		26
Uganda	0	0	0	0		6
Ukraine	2	2	275	279		18
United States of America	4	5	0	9		11
Uruguay	0	0	0	0		0
Yemen	0	1	0	1		6
Zambia	3	0	0	3		25
Zimbabwe	2	0	0	2		37
Total	128	83	7 853	8 064	843	456

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
8 August 2011

Original: English

Assessment report of the Secretary-General on the status of the negotiations in Cyprus**I. Introduction**

1. This report provides an updated assessment of the state of the negotiations in Cyprus since my last report of 4 March 2011 (S/2011/112).
2. This is my third assessment report to the Security Council since I met with the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community in New York in November 2010, when they committed themselves to increase the tempo of negotiations and to focus their efforts on identifying and reaching convergence on the core issues. This report also comes after my latest meeting with the two leaders in Geneva on 7 July.
3. I have been concerned that the talks were beginning to drift and that little tangible progress was being made. In April, it was decided to postpone our follow-up meeting until more progress could be achieved. At the meeting on 7 July in Geneva, I reiterated my concern that progress was sluggish and discussed with the two leaders ways in which the situation could be addressed. The leaders agreed to intensify the pace of negotiations, improve the methodology of the talks, and push for a conclusion as soon as possible. They also agreed to meet me again in October in New York, by which time I expect that they will be able to report convergence on all core issues.
4. These talks are taking longer than we had hoped. Almost three years have elapsed since the start of the full-fledged negotiations in September 2008. Since then, the leaders have met well over 100 times and, still, many of the core issues remain unresolved. After I met with the leaders in November 2010, the sides initially gave focused and productive attention to the core issues, which resulted in convergences on the economy and European Union-related chapters. Both sides have presented bridging proposals on various occasions on a number of issues under negotiation. They have also increased the frequency of their meetings in recent months, but unfortunately with limited results. Progress continues to be far too slow. At the current pace, it is not likely that an agreement can be reached for quite some time. It is clear that all the elements of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation in Cyprus are known to the sides in this negotiation, yet a comprehensive solution has so far eluded the parties, as it has for decades.



5. We have clearly reached a defining moment in the talks, when all efforts must be employed to keep the process viable and capable of delivering a mutually beneficial solution. I expect the two leaders to reach such a solution as soon as possible.

II. Background

6. This assessment report follows my fourth meeting with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders. When I visited the island in January 2010, Dimitris Christofias, the Greek Cypriot leader, and the then Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, issued a joint statement expressing confidence that they could achieve a solution in the shortest possible time. Following the change of leadership on the Turkish Cypriot side and a several-week hiatus in negotiations, I was able to announce in May 2010 that the talks would continue on the same basis and from where they had left off. Mr. Christofias and the new Turkish Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, also made statements at that juncture, recognizing that time was not on the side of a settlement and committing themselves to the process of negotiating a mutually beneficial settlement. Six months later, in November 2010, I met with the two leaders in New York and asked them to concentrate their efforts on the core issues. Our next meeting was held on 26 January 2011 in Geneva, where we again focused on the goal of reaching convergence on the core issues, and the leaders agreed to intensify the negotiations. After the January meeting, I indicated that I would call another meeting soon to review developments. In April, I spoke with both the leaders and informed them of my decision that more progress should be made before we met again. I stressed the need to accelerate the process. In May, I invited the leaders to meet with me in Geneva in July to identify the difficulties standing in the way of reaching a comprehensive agreement and to discuss strategies for significantly picking up the pace of the negotiations.

7. When I met Mr. Christofias and Mr. Eroglu in Geneva on 7 July, I reiterated to them my continuing belief that, with enough political will, a deal should be possible. I pointed out that several decades had been spent by their predecessors and mine exploring ways of uniting the island, and that both sides knew where the compromises needed to be made.

8. I have repeatedly pointed out to the leaders, as I did in my last report, that the United Nations expects the two sides to assume primary responsibility for driving the process forward. The Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned process has the full support of the United Nations, but it is the two leaders who must take the necessary actions to reconcile the differences between their two communities.

9. In support of the process, I have used the period since my last report to keep the solution of the Cyprus question high on the agenda of the United Nations, as well as on the agenda of key regional and international leaders. This has become particularly important as a number of other pressing issues in the region have taken on greater immediacy. I continued to discuss the Cyprus question with various Heads of State and senior officials, including the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül; the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, David Cameron, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg; as well as the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso. My Special Adviser continued to engage with senior officials who are pivotal to the process, particularly

those of the three guarantor Powers, namely Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

III. Status of the process

10. In the five months since my last report, the rate of progress in the talks has slowed, despite the regularity of the meetings between the leaders and their representatives. The leaders met 17 times and their representatives met 28 times during this period. Both sides continue to make efforts at putting forward bridging proposals, but the approach to achieving compromise has not always been productive or yielded results. A considerable amount of time has been spent in clarifying positions instead of moving towards convergences.

11. Late in March, the sides began discussing the internal aspects of security. The discussions focused on policing and law enforcement arrangements in a united Cyprus at both the federal level and that of the federated units or constituent States. The sides have come close to agreement on the details of this issue, although several important outstanding aspects remain to be resolved.

12. On property, I am pleased that both sides made use of the international technical experts whose services I offered when I met with the leaders in Geneva in January. This has enabled each side to explore a range of technical issues and to further develop proposals in this area. However, the return to formal negotiations on property is long overdue. There remains fundamental disagreement on the issue of conditions for restitution and the mode for exchange. Negotiations on the matter of territory should also be initiated as it remains one of the chapters least explored to date. This can be done without prejudice to the fact that both sides have agreed that the issue of maps and figures related to this chapter should be discussed only during the last phase of the process prior to a multilateral meeting.

13. Since my last report, the discussions on governance have focused on the capacity to conclude international treaties and the procedure for doing so, and the federal-level decision-making procedure with regard to foreign affairs, and have led to convergence on the principle of representation abroad. Importantly, the sides reached agreement on international treaties binding on the united Cyprus. As a result, the Subcommittee on International Treaties has resumed its work and has met twice.

14. The important agreements on the economy that were reached before the issuance of my last report remain in place. Nothing further was discussed in relation to the European Union in this period. The primary remaining divergence concerns how the settlement agreement will be incorporated into European Union law in order to ensure its legal certainty. The issue of citizenship has not been discussed substantively since I met with the leaders in January. In response to the Greek Cypriot call for a demographic census, I made available the expertise of the United Nations in this area. The census process is only a related matter, however. While the census process is being carried out, the sides must resolve the core issue of who should be considered citizens of the united Cyprus.

15. The technical committees, established in 2008, continued to meet on the implementation of confidence-building measures intended to improve the daily lives

of Cypriots. Three of the seven technical committees, which were dormant since July 2008, have now resumed their work.

16. According to the latest polls, while both communities are losing confidence in the possibility of a united Cyprus, their desire for a solution has not faltered. United Nations agencies and programmes in Cyprus are working closely with local partners in support of the peace process. With the collaboration of Cyprus 2015 and ENGAGE, a group of Cypriot non-governmental organizations supported by the United Nations Development Programme, various events were organized to facilitate public dialogue on issues related to the talks. The opening in the buffer zone of the "Home for Cooperation" by the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research was a landmark event; the facility will provide a space for inter-communal education, dialogue and research. Under the Economic Interdependence project, the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce launched the first joint report on current levels of economic interdependence between the two communities. Their findings confirmed that a settlement would be economically beneficial to both communities. The Gender Advisory Team provided the leaders with recommendations on gender issues relating to property and citizenship, in addition to a previous submission on governance. The youth groups of the two leading political parties on either side sent me a joint letter, asking me to encourage the leaders to reach a solution now. I reiterate my call to Mr. Christofias and Mr. Eroglu to engage civil society in the task of reaching a comprehensive settlement and to take into account these and other important civil society efforts to contribute to the peace process.

17. Regarding the broader assessment of the United Nations presence in Cyprus, which I have announced in previous reports, internal discussions continue as to the potential scope and timing of such an exercise.

IV. Meeting of 7 July

18. On 7 July, I met with both leaders at the United Nations Office at Geneva. I explained that I was disappointed in the lack of progress. I noted that although both sides had worked steadily since our meeting in January, they had not touched important areas in the negotiations despite the prior agreement to concentrate on resolving core issues. I pointed out that the pace of the negotiations had become far too slow. I stressed the importance of the two leaders focusing their energies on reaching broad agreements rather than dwelling on individual problems in minute detail, and said that the methodology of the negotiations needed to be improved. I asked the leaders to put aside all other matters in the negotiations and to concentrate on finding a way through the difficult core issues.

19. Despite my sobering assessment, the meeting was held in a constructive and positive atmosphere. Both sides acknowledged the difficulties. They both canvassed their positions across all chapters in the negotiations and put forward bridging proposals in a range of areas. This exercise helped to further explain, and in some cases clarify, the positions of the sides across the various negotiating chapters. Most importantly, the meeting contributed significantly to tracing a way forward, and thus succeeded in becoming more than a "stock-taking exercise" of the process.

20. With the two leaders, I was able to identify some of the stumbling blocks that have stood in the way of reaching a comprehensive settlement thus far. We agreed

on the need to significantly accelerate the pace of the talks and move into intensive negotiations and to focus on the core issues. In that regard, the leaders accepted my recommendation to engage in negotiations for two full days each week. We also agreed that, without prejudice to the central principle of a Cypriot-owned and Cypriot-led process, there would be enhanced United Nations involvement.

21. The leaders also accepted my invitation to meet again in October in New York, by which time I expect they will be able to report convergence on all core issues. This would take the Cyprus negotiations closer to their conclusion and would allow me to give a positive report to the Security Council on the matter. It would also pave the way for me to work with the parties towards convening a final, international conference. Both leaders made it clear that they will strive to reach a comprehensive solution as soon as possible.

22. The leaders also acknowledged the need to begin building support for a comprehensive agreement in order to renew hope and enthusiasm for a solution across the island. This includes the critical task of preparing their respective communities for the compromises required for a settlement and the prospect of living together in a united Cyprus.

V. Observations

23. I am pleased that the two leaders have agreed to intensify the negotiations, improve the methodology of the talks and redouble their efforts to reach convergence on all core issues. This will increase the prospects of reaching an agreement. In order to increase the tempo and achieve significant results, the sides must engage in a more dynamic negotiating process and enter unequivocally into the next phase of the negotiations. This new phase would entail a comprehensive approach on all core issues and substantive trade-offs within and across chapters.

24. In order for a reinvigorated process to fully take root and be successful, other elements must also be present. The sides must work clearly within the agreed parameters of a solution, and work to reach a common, shared objective within those parameters. The leaders must desist from playing the "blame game" and each focus on what more they can do to pave the way for a solution. As I have reiterated on various occasions, and as the Security Council recently stated in its resolution 1986 (2011), the sides should refrain from negative rhetoric about the process and about each other and work to build support for a settlement deal. Finally, the sides urgently need to safeguard the integrity and confidentiality of the talks by stopping leaks on positions and other sensitive information.

VI. Conclusions

25. The key to solving the Cyprus issue is the two sides working with political will and determination towards the same clear and common objectives, with a united Cyprus as the end result. To reunite Cyprus, there must be a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with two equal constituent parts, with a single sovereignty and single international personality, as laid out in relevant Security Council resolutions.

26. I was pleased with the demonstrated commitment of both sides in Geneva and that the leaders committed themselves to the endeavour of reaching convergence on

all core issues by our next meeting in October. It is my hope that I can subsequently report their achievements to the Security Council and that, provided the necessary progress has been made by that time, we could then begin discussing the convening of a multilateral conference to conclude the international aspects of the agreement.

27. By October 2011, the current negotiations will have been going on for more than three years. It is well understood that time is definitely not on the side of a solution, and successive polling on citizens' views in Cyprus has confirmed this all too clearly. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities deserve to be presented with a viable, mutually beneficial settlement proposal in the shortest time possible. The leaders must rise to the occasion.



Security Council

Distr.: General
9 August 2011
English
Original: Spanish

**Letter dated 4 August 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement concerning the Syrian Arab Republic that was made today by Mr. Marcos Rodríguez Costa, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rodolfo Benítez Versón
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the letter dated 4 August 2011 from the Chargé
d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

**Statement concerning the Syrian Arab Republic by the Deputy
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba**

Havana, 4 August 2011

We express great concern at the handling of the internal situation in Syria by the United Nations Security Council; the Western Powers that are members of that organ are exerting strong pressure with a view to the adoption of resolutions condemning the legitimate Government of that country.

In light of the experience and precedent already set by recent cases, which have evidenced the manipulation of the Charter of the United Nations and the double standard that characterizes the actions of the Security Council, we express our rejection of any attempt to undermine the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that nation.

Cuba reiterates its confidence in the capacity of the Syrian people and Government to resolve their internal problems without any foreign interference and demands full respect for the self-determination and sovereignty of that Arab country.

**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
9 August 2011

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
**Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East
Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory**

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

**Identical letters dated 8 August 2011 from the Permanent
Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

I am compelled to bring to your attention the escalating tensions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as a result of Israel's illegal policies and practices of military aggression and colonization and its continuous provocations and incitement against the Palestinian people. In this regard, the situation on the ground continues to remain highly volatile and unsustainable and requires urgent redress by the international community so as to bring a halt to the massive violations that continue to be perpetrated by Israel against the Palestinian people.

Instead of advancing peace, Israel, the occupying Power, has chosen to do the exact opposite by intensifying its violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In this connection, as the Palestinian people observe the holy month of Ramadan, Israel, the occupying Power, has continued to employ indiscriminate and disproportionate force, causing death and injury to civilians, including women and children. One such incident that illustrates the utter disregard for Palestinian life took place just before dawn prayers on 1 August 2011, the first day of Ramadan, in which Israeli occupying forces raided the Qalandiya refugee camp, in the West Bank, killing two young men. The two young men, Mu'tasim Odwan, 22 years old, and Mohammed Ali Khalifa, 23 years old, were shot in the head and stomach, respectively, and died instantly. Scores of Palestinian civilians were also injured and many were rounded up and illegally detained during the same ferocious military raid.

Moreover, the Palestinian people in the besieged Gaza Strip have not been spared the wrath of the occupying Power as it continues to commit acts of military aggression against the more than 1.5 million inhabitants living there. Over the past week, Israeli occupying forces launched multiple air strikes against the Gaza Strip, including an air strike targeting a group of fishermen on the shores of Rafah. The air strikes resulted in the injury of scores of Palestinians and caused extensive material



damage to homes and properties. It must be recalled that military attacks against civilian areas, such as these latest crimes by the occupying Power, are unlawful under international humanitarian law and constitute grave acts of terror, provocation and incitement against the Palestinian people. In addition to being punished by the incessant military aggression against them, the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip continues to be collectively punished by the occupying Power's illegitimate blockade which continues to deepen poverty and despair in Gaza. The Palestinian leadership appeals to the international community to call on Israel to cease its military attacks against the Gaza Strip and to abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law and to cease forthwith all attacks against the Palestinian civilian population and its collective punishment, including by fully lifting the blockade.

At the same time, Israel has been unrelenting in its illegal drive to colonize the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in its ongoing illegal attempts to change the reality on the ground in Occupied East Jerusalem through settlement expansion, home demolitions, evictions and the displacement of hundreds of Palestinians. In the latest illegal, reckless and provocative declaration, which came on Thursday, 4 August 2011, the Israeli government announced the approval given to building 900 more settlement units in the so-called settlement of "Har Homa" located in Jabal Abu Ghneim in Occupied East Jerusalem. In addition to making the recent provocative declaration of the intention to construct more illegal settlement units in Occupied East Jerusalem, the Israeli occupying forces have in recent days carried out the destruction of more Palestinian property and land. These illegal actions once again confirm Israel's deliberate intent to defy international law and the unequivocal calls of the international community for the immediate and full cessation of all Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. In this regard, we regret to reiterate that continued international inaction has clearly emboldened Israel in its defiance and intransigence.

Hand in hand with its increased settlement activity is the rise in home demolitions and displacement of Palestinian civilians by the occupying Power. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released a report last week documenting alarming trends in the forced displacement of Palestinians and stated that more home demolitions have taken place so far in 2011 than in all of 2009 and 2010 combined. More specifically, the report stated that 342 Palestinian-owned structures had been demolished by the occupying Power in the first half of 2011; and 656 people, including 351 children, lost their homes in the first half of 2011, almost five times more than within the same period last year. Shockingly, there are currently over 3,000 demolition orders outstanding, including 18 targeting schools. We thus call on the international community to condemn the destruction of Palestinian homes and the subsequent displacement of entire families and to take the necessary actions to compel the occupying Power to halt this ruthless and cruel practice.

Moreover, I regret to inform you that Israeli settler-related terror, violence, harassment and intimidation against the Palestinian civilian population throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, have intensified. Despicable and destructive acts against Palestinian civilians and their properties have continued unabated, including four separate incidents last week, in which settlers set fire to Palestinian agricultural property in the villages of Turmusayya,

Burin and Awarta in the West Bank, damaging about 400 olive and almond trees. Settlers even attacked the Palestinian fire brigade as it was attempting to extinguish the fires. Reports have also indicated that a shocking 4,000 or more trees belonging to Palestinians have been uprooted, burned or otherwise vandalized by settlers since the beginning of the year. Additionally, in two separate incidents in Hebron, settlers from the so-called settlement outpost called "Havat Ma'on" attacked and injured five international activists, who were escorting children from a summer camp in a nearby village and assisting Palestinian shepherds in accessing their land.

We are clearly at a critical juncture and the international community, including the Security Council, must rise to the challenge of upholding its responsibilities in respect of bringing Israel into compliance with its obligations as an occupying Power. Therefore, the international community must not allow Israel, the occupying Power, to perpetrate, with total impunity and without accountability, military attacks, the killing and injury of innocent civilians, the destruction of homes and property, the colonization of the Palestinian land, collective punishment, and the arbitrary imprisonment and detention of Palestinian civilians. We firmly believe that only serious coordinated action can compel Israel, the occupying Power, to cease forthwith all its illegal activities and thereby prevent this volatile situation from further escalation.

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 397 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 20 July 2011 (A/ES-10/525-S/2011/445), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Riyadh **Mansour**
Ambassador

Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations



Security Council

Distr.: General
8 August 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 8 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 7 August 2011, from His Excellency Walid Moualem, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of the Syrian Arab Republic, which represents the position of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the presidential statement issued by the Security Council on 3 August 2011 (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 8 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

Syrian Arab Republic

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants

I regret to say that certain members of the Security Council, in the statement issued by that body, based its position on information that was taken from only one side, without giving the consideration that is particularly due in the light of the current situation in Syria to the facts and information provided by the Syrian State, which is the party with primary and ultimate responsibility and concern for the security and stability of the Syrian people and the integrity of its land and institutions.

There are numerous exaggerations in the depiction of current events in Syria, and the reality of what is taking place on the ground is magnified with provocative and alarmist intent. The number of casualties is similarly exaggerated, while the damage and human and material losses that are being inflicted on Syria through the murderous and destructive acts of armed gangs are deliberately ignored. That regrettable disregard for the facts on the ground, which informed the Security Council statement, is an extremely negative factor in respect of Syrian interests, because it encourages the armed gangs of wreckers to continue to use weapons and carry out acts of murder and destruction, thereby considerably hindering the chances of preserving the fundamental interests of the country.

As you are aware, President Bashar Al-Assad, in his statement of 20 June 2011, set out a package of significant reforms concerning a number of aspects of public life in Syria and, in particular, the political aspect, in the laws governing parties and general elections. Those two laws make important provisions that respond to the demands of the people and lay the foundations for political plurality and democracy. It has already been announced that general elections will be held before the end of 2011 and that political affairs will be decided through the ballot box.

I have referred above to just a few of the plans and ideas that were announced by President Al-Assad in the aforementioned statement. The Syrian leadership continues to believe that national dialogue is the best way to resolve the crisis through which the country is passing. However, the difficulty of conducting that dialogue, which is caused by the negativity of the opposition stance, will not divert us from moving along the path of the reform which we desire; we will not allow subversion and conspiracies against the interests of Syria to prevent us continuing towards our goal.

We believe that, at this crucial point for Syria, it behoves the international community to promote peace and the end of acts of destruction, and to encourage the steps towards reform that are being taken. Sufficient time must be allowed for those reforms to bear fruit, rather than encouragement being provided for an escalation of the unrest and violence. It is with the greatest regret that we say that the statements that are being issued by certain members of the Security Council,

which are intended to increase pressure on Syria, in fact merely serve to exacerbate the disturbances and violence, which in no way serves the interests of Syria.

(Signed) Walid **Al-Moualem**
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of the Syrian Arab Republic



Security Council

Distr.: General
9 August 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 4 August 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which was established on 14 August 2003 in accordance with Security Council resolution 1500 (2003).

Following the usual consultations, I would like to inform you of my intention to appoint Mr. Martin Kobler (Germany) as my Special Representative and Head of UNAMI.

Mr. Kobler will replace Mr. Ad Melkert (the Netherlands) who has served in Iraq for over two years. I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for Mr. Melkert's leadership of UNAMI in implementing its mandate under Security Council resolution 1770 (2007) and subsequent resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) **BAN** Ki-moon





Security Council

Distr.: General
9 August 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 8 August 2011 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 4 August 2011 (S/2011/502) concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Martin Kobler (Germany) as your Special Representative for Iraq and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(Signed) H. S. Puri
President of the Security Council

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
11 August 2011

Original: English

Identical letters dated 9 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to draw your attention to a troubling escalation in the firing of rockets and mortars at Israel from the Gaza Strip, which provides yet another clear example of Hamas' destabilizing role in our region.

Since 14 July 2011, terrorists in Gaza have launched some 16 rockets and 6 mortars into southern Israel, deliberately targeting Israeli civilians and causing injuries. For example, on 1 August 2011, terrorists fired a rocket into the area near Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, injuring a 55-year-old woman. On 4 August 2011, five more civilians were injured when a rocket landed in close proximity to Ashkelon — a major city home to more than 100,000 people. Other attacks in the past month have occurred in or around other areas with large civilian populations, including the city of Kiryat Gat, Mosahv Kfar Maimon, Kibbutz Zikim and Kibbutz Kfar Aza.

These attacks — a flagrant violation of international law — must be addressed with the utmost seriousness and resolve. It is no mystery why terrorists continue to operate with impunity in Gaza. The violence that continues to flow from the Gaza Strip reveals the true face of Hamas, which cannot be hidden beneath the mask of a unity agreement.

The continuous barrage of rocket fire into Israel is fuelled by the illegal smuggling of arms into Gaza. Preventing this activity — an integral part of Security Council resolution 1860 (2009) — does not receive the attention that it deserves from the international community.

Israel holds Hamas fully responsible for all attacks emanating from Gaza, where it remains in de facto control. In response to these attacks, Israel has exercised and will continue to exercise its right to self-defence, as appropriate, and will take all necessary measures to protect its citizens. Israel expects the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the international community to clearly condemn all of these terrorist attacks, sending a firm message to Hamas and its patrons, which seek to escalate conflict in our region.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ron Prosor
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
10 August 2011

Original: English

**General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session**

Agenda item 34

**Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and
their implications for international peace,
security and development**

**Security Council
Sixty-sixth year**

**Identical letters dated 9 August 2011 from the Permanent
Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia dated 5 August 2011 concerning the third anniversary of the August war (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as an official document of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alexander Lomaia
Permanent Representative

**Annex to the identical letters dated 9 August 2011 from the
Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council**

**Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding
the third anniversary of the August war**

7 August 2011 marks the third anniversary of Russia's open and full-scale military aggression against Georgia. Unfortunately, three years after the August war, Russia still continues its aggression policy directed towards the destruction of the statehood, sovereignty and independence of Georgia, as well as against Georgian nationals.

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the restoration of Georgia's independence, the Russian Federation has been engaged in a consistent and deliberate fight against the independent State of Georgia. The Russian Federation employs many methods in this fight and does not even refrain from the flagrant violation of the fundamental norms of international law. During the last 20 years, the Russian Federation has conducted several waves of ethnic cleansing in Georgia's integral regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. As a result, hundreds of thousands of citizens were forced to leave their places of residence. Since 2000 Russia has actively used its economic and energy levers against Georgia. The embargo Russia imposed on Georgian products is still in place. In August 2008, the Russian Federation carried out large-scale military aggression against Georgia, occupied 20 per cent of its territory and recognized as "independent States" the occupation regimes created by Russia itself. The Russian Federation has now proceeded to new methods in its fight against Georgia — from 2010 onwards, Russia has masterminded over 12 terrorist acts in the territory of Georgia, most of which, fortunately, were thwarted by the Georgian law enforcement agencies.

By taking such actions, the Russian Federation demonstratively breaches the main norms and principles of international law and its bilateral and multilateral obligations, including all resolutions on Georgia adopted by the Security Council and all provisions of the six-point ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008. It is significant to note that the Russian Federation "got rid" of any international presence in the Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia, thus making these regions into so-called "black holes" of organized crime, trafficking and violation of human rights. Hence, the international community is today deprived of any access to objective information from the occupied territories.

On the third anniversary of the war, the Russian Federation is still proceeding with its attempts to "buy" so-called "independence" of the Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia by holding trainings of occupation troops in the occupied territories, carrying out visits of high-ranking Russian officials, conducting rapid militarization of the regions and construction of military bases there. Of particular concern is the deployment of rocket launchers and artillery mounts in the occupied territories.

Russia's aggressive policy against Georgia has recently taken on a new dimension, manifesting itself in organizing and funding terrorist acts in the remaining non-occupied territory of Georgia by representatives of the Russian occupation forces, in particular, by officials of the Ministry of Defence Main

Intelligence Directorate and the Federal Security Service. This has resulted in casualties among the peaceful population.

The foregoing lays bare Russia's aggressive plans regarding Georgia and poses a threat to the peace and stability of the entire Caucasus and Black Sea regions. It is obvious that the Russian Federation does not seem to reject the idea of a new full-scale military aggression against Georgia.

It is a regrettable fact that the Russian Federation's aggressive policy makes it impossible for hundreds of thousands of people internally displaced as a result of ethnic cleansing to return to their places of origin. Russia adopts a clearly discriminatory approach to people of Georgian origin. Moreover, even ethnic Georgians holding Russian citizenship are denied their rights, including property rights, in the occupied territories. The policy of ethnic cleansing is still continuing, this time by changing the names of historical and geographical sites in the occupied areas, destroying Georgian architectural monuments or reshaping them in the Russian style.

Despite such actions of Russia, the Georgian Government has elected to pursue a peaceful policy oriented towards development, dialogue and engagement. Georgia fully complies with all obligations under the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 and adheres to the memorandums of understanding signed by the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Internal Affairs with the European Union Monitoring Mission. In his address to the European Parliament on 23 November 2010, the President of Georgia made a unilateral declaration not to use force in order to restore control over our illegally divided country, neither against the occupation forces, nor against their proxies.

Georgia spares no diplomatic effort to achieve the restoration of the presence of international organizations in the occupied territories and to provide objective information to international organizations concerning the current security and human rights situation. Georgia continues constructive engagement in the Geneva talks and remains committed to holding an unconditional dialogue with the Russian Federation at any stage for the peaceful resolution of the existing problems.

In parallel, the Government of Georgia is motivated to create favourable conditions for the residents of the Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia to live in a stable, peaceful and developed Georgia. For this purpose, the Georgian Government worked out a strategy and a plan of action for these regions, which are oriented towards improving the economic and social conditions for our Abkhazian and Ossetian compatriots and ending the isolation of these regions.

The past three years have shown that Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic integration is an irreversible process and the only right way to develop the country. Integration with the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains at the top of the list of Georgia's foreign political priorities, the fulfilment of which will ensure against the recurrence of any aggression similar to that of August 2008.

Three years after the 2008 war, Georgia still remains in a vulnerable international environment. Fundamental threats continue to emanate from the Russian Federation. In spite of this, Georgia is convinced that the correct strategy it has chosen to pursue and a security policy focused on peace, dialogue and engagement will yield results and the threats proceeding from Russia will never

materialize. A tribute for this, quite naturally, goes to the international community's support and the civilized world's firm position on Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the inadmissibility of Russia's occupation of the territories of Georgia.

Tbilisi, 5 August 2011